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The Lowy Institute for International Policy is an independent policy think 
tank. Its mandate ranges across all the dimensions of international policy 
debate in Australia – economic, political and strategic – and it is not 
limited to a particular geographic region. Its two core tasks are to: 
• produce distinctive research and fresh policy options for Australia’s 
international policy and to contribute to the wider international debate. 
• promote discussion of Australia’s role in the world by providing an 
accessible and high-quality forum for discussion of Australian 
international relations through debates, seminars, lectures, dialogues 
and conferences. 
 
Lowy Institute Analyses are short papers analysing recent international
trends and events and their policy implications. 
The views expressed in this paper are entirely the author’s own and
not those of the Lowy Institute for International Policy. 
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
Australia’s inability to clearly and succinctly define its defence strategy is 
a perennial failing that will have serious policy and operational 
consequences if not addressed. Australia’s recent defence white papers 
are part of the problem: they lack coherence, their messaging is poor, 
and many of their underlying assumptions and planning practices are 
questionable. 
The forthcoming defence white paper provides the first real opportunity 
for the Abbott government to carry out a much-needed reset of 
Australia’s defence and military strategies. In place of a maritime 
strategy, Australia needs to adopt a “full spectrum” approach to defence 
that can provide protection against military threats  from outer space and 
cyber space, as well as the conventional domains of land, sea and air. 
Full spectrum defence must be underpinned by deeper and broader 
regional defence partnerships and by a risk assessment process that 
encourages critical thinking about strategy and the future capabilities of 
the Australian Defence Force. 
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Outside the fields of defence and national security, an inability to meet 
strategic objectives may be serious but is seldom fatal. The failure of a 
country’s defence strategy can cost many lives and, in the worst case, 
lead to the destruction of nations and even societies. So defence 
planners understandably take strategy very seriously, although not solely 
because of its determining impact on the battlefield. A defence strategy 
supports the nation’s broader political and foreign policy aims with 
military power, both hard and soft. It also provides a rationale for the use 
of the country’s defence force and its size, structure and capabilities. 
As the Australian Government drafts a new defence white paper the aim 
of this Analysis is to examine the fundamentals of Australian strategy. It 
will suggest some defects in current strategy and identify a number of 
steps that need to be taken to reset Australia’s defence strategy given 
the evolving strategic environment. 
WHAT’S WRONG WITH AUSTRALIA’S DEFENCE 
STRATEGY? 
Australia’s current defence strategy suffers from six major defects. None 
of them are easily addressed, but they need to be if defence policy is to 
meet the strategic challenges that the country faces. Australia’s defence 
strategy lacks coherence. Declaratory policy bears little resemblance to 
what the Australian Defence Force (ADF) actually does. Strategic 
assumptions that are poorly conceived and highly contestable have 
been elevated into incontestable dogma. Notably, it is illusory to believe 
that Australia’s geography provides “immutable” and “abiding” strategic 
benefits or that superior intelligence can be relied upon to provide early 
warning of emerging threats. And there is a worrying superficiality in 
official public pronouncements about the consequences of recent shifts 
in US strategic thinking and force posture. 
DECLARATORY CONFUSION AND POOR MESSAGING 
Given the number of defence white papers that have been published 
since the first appeared in 1976, finding a clear statement of Australia’s 
defence strategy would seem a straightforward task. That it is not, 
suggests a problem of both process and content. Even the most 
determined and forensically inclined reader will struggle to find a simple, 
clear statement of Australia’s defence strategy and objectives. They 
frequently have to be inferred, or extracted piecemeal, from the 
voluminous pages of recent white papers. 
Since the admirably short and succinct 1976 Defence White Paper, 
which totals 59 pages, subsequent white papers have steadily increased 
in length and density of prose, topped by the record-breaking 138 pages 
Australia’s current 
defence strategy suffers 
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of the 2009 Defence White Paper.1 Such inflation of wordage has had 
negative effects. Far from contributing to greater clarity and 
transparency, the density of these white papers has made it difficult for 
those involved in defence policy to know what Australia’s strategy really 
is. This has encouraged self-interested and contradictory interpretations. 
The imprecise use of accompanying adjectives has further muddied the 
conceptual waters by conflating different kinds of strategy. Defence 
strategy should refer to the overarching strategic outcomes we seek 
through the employment and use of a professional defence force. A 
military strategy, on the other hand, needs to explain how these 
outcomes are to be achieved in practice. They are not coterminous. 
GEOGRAPHY AS DOGMA 
These messaging deficiencies are compounded by flaws in the thinking 
and assumptions that underpin defence strategy. At the broadest level, 
Australia’s defence strategy has two main purposes: to help shape the 
regional and international security environment in support of a rules-
based, liberal democratic order; and to deter and, if necessary, defeat 
armed attacks against the nation’s territory, people and vital interests. 
With minor variations, these two objectives have been an enduring and 
largely unremarked feature of Australian defence strategy since the 1976 
Defence White Paper, attracting little criticism or debate. 
The same could not be said of Australia’s military strategy where official 
thinking is still infected by an overly rigid, determinist approach to 
strategic risk management. This distorts both our strategy, and the 
structure of the ADF, by placing undue emphasis on defending Australia 
from conventional military attacks and persisting with the illusion that 
geography provides Australia with “immutable” and “abiding” strategic 
benefits.2 
There is no doubt that Australia’s geography once afforded Australians a 
measure of protection from military threats due to the continent’s relative 
distance from most global conflicts and transnational challenges. But 
distance and location are far less of a barrier today. In some respects, 
they are no barrier at all because globalisation is continuing to shrink 
physical space at an ever-accelerating rate. Australia’s heightened 
vulnerability to global threats is also a function of the rapidly increasing 
range of modern weapon systems, particularly conventional and ballistic 
missiles; the emergence of powerful, transnational actors capable of 
operating across borders with little or no regard for sovereignty; and the 
growing importance of space and cyber space as new arenas for 
strategic competition and conflict. 
The consistent declaratory position of recent white papers is that the 
near region should be prioritised over more distant areas in our strategy, 
deployments and force structure. Attempts to codify this contestable 
assumption have produced impressive sounding constructs such as “our 
Defence strategy should 
refer to the overarching 
strategic outcomes we 
seek through the 
employment and use of a 
professional defence 
force. 
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area of direct military interest,” “primary area of strategic interest” and 
“primary operational environment.”3  In practice, however, the ADF’s 
actual deployments have been more distant, than near. 
Balanced against nearby commitments to the Solomon Islands, Papua 
New Guinea (Bougainville), Indonesia (Aceh) and East Timor (twice) in 
peacekeeping, peace enforcement and humanitarian missions have 
been a multitude of more distant, and frequently more complex and 
demanding, operational deployments. Since 1993, they have included 
Namibia, Somalia, Western Sahara, Rwanda, Cambodia, Iraq (three 
times), the Persian Gulf and Afghanistan (twice). Only a third of the 
ADF’s deployments over the past twenty years have been in our 
supposed area of direct military interest. Moreover, this gap between 
declaratory and actual policy is growing, as governments continue to ask 
more of the ADF and distance becomes less of a determining factor in 
our strategy and operational deployments. 
It might be argued that more distant conflicts are wars of choice and that 
those closer to home are wars of necessity, but this misconstrues the 
choices confronting governments. One government’s principled and 
necessary intervention may be another’s act of imprudence or discretion. 
In fact, there is little consensus on what constitutes a war of necessity.4 
Proximity is only one of many variables that must be considered when 
planning the future force. 
The assertion that the nearby must take precedence over the distant as 
the defining principle of our strategy has been further undermined by the 
constantly changing and expanding definition of what constitutes our 
near-neighbourhood. In 1976, Northeast Asia was considered a distant 
area and an area beyond which the ADF would carry out meaningful 
defence activity.5 But the 2009 Defence White Paper argued that 
Australia has an enduring interest in the wider Asia-Pacific region. The 
2013 Defence White Paper went further in declaring that the even more 
expansive Indo-Pacific region, incorporating Northeast Asia, India and 
much of the eastern Indian Ocean, had become a “priority strategic 
focus.”6 If one includes the Southern Ocean and Australia’s claim to a 
large part of Antarctica, this means that for defence planning purposes 
we prioritise nearly 20 per cent of the planet, making a mockery of the 
claim that proximity ought to be the determining influence on defence 
strategy. 
THE LIMITATIONS OF A MARITIME STRATEGY 
A third major failing is the misplaced belief that Australia’s defence 
strategy is, or should be, a maritime strategy. The 2013 Defence White 
Paper declares that Australia’s geography requires a maritime strategy 
and a former Chief of Navy has argued for a maritime “third way” 
between the continentalist and the expeditionary traditions of Australian 
strategic thinking.7 The problem with these assertions is the confusion of 
A third major failing is the 
misplaced belief that 
Australia’s defence 
strategy is, or should be, 
a maritime strategy. 
 FULL SPECTRUM DEFENCE: RE-THINKING THE FUNDAMENTALS OF AUSTRALIAN DEFENCE STRATEGY 
 
5
 
orientation and strategy. There is, of course, an important maritime 
dimension to our military strategy which is hardly surprising for a country 
that is an island continent and heavily reliant on international trade. But 
this is better articulated as a narrower, operational sub-set of our military 
strategy which must include other domains and potential threats. 
In a world of complex and mutating security challenges, defending 
against a particular kind of military attack should be seen as one of a 
number of possible contingencies for which our military should prepare, 
but not to the exclusion of other important tasks or threats. The reality is 
that the northern approaches to Australia through the South China, 
Timor and Arafura Seas, along with the contiguous airspace, form only 
one part of a multi-dimensional continuum (land, sea, air, space and 
cyber space) connecting Australia with Asia and the world. Threats may 
originate from any one of these domains and impact on all five: witness 
the steady proliferation of ballistic missile technology and the daily cyber 
attacks on our critical defence systems from both state and non-state 
actors. In the multi-dimensional, interconnected conflict zones of the 21st 
century it makes no sense to build a military strategy around a particular 
domain or assume that future adversaries will follow a predictable route 
or plan. 
A particular weakness of our military strategy is its failure to reflect the 
crucial role that space and cyber space play in modern military 
operations. Space-based systems, such as intelligence, communications 
and global positioning satellites, are the new jewels in the ADF’s crown 
because they are essential for command and control, identifying, 
locating and destroying targets and providing early warning of ballistic 
missile attacks. As the 2013 Defence White Paper makes clear, “space-
based systems are a critical enabler of a modern, networked military 
capability” so their protection must be prioritised.8  
The Wideband Global SATCOM system, for example, provides rapid 
and secure communications for deployed troops and will allow 
Australia’s new air warfare destroyers and amphibious ships to be 
networked with unmanned aerial vehicles and a variety of other 
platforms and weapons systems.9 Moreover, the proliferation of 
computers, the pervasiveness of the internet and the probability that 
future wars will also be fought in cyber space has heightened the need 
to protect our cyber capabilities from hostile attack as well as developing 
cyber weapons of our own. 
However, the growing importance of cyber and outer space has not 
been adequately factored into our strategic thinking and defence white 
papers. There has been no real attempt to draw out the defence 
implications of a future world in which attacks may come from any 
domain and direction, or where the source of the attack is difficult to 
establish with a high degree of precision or attribution. A maritime 
A particular weakness of 
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strategy, with its emphasis on the sea and air, provides little guidance for 
dealing with the vitally important fourth and fifth domains of warfare.  
CONTESTABLE FORCE STRUCTURE ASSUMPTIONS 
A fourth weakness is the use of what the Department of Defence calls 
“force structure determinants.” These began life as planning principles to 
help government determine the optimum size, capabilities and priority 
tasks of the defence force. Unfortunately, these principles have become 
enshrined as strategic verities when in reality they are generalised and 
highly contestable assumptions. This has led to dangerous group-think 
that privileges established practice and plans but discourages debate 
about the merits of particular capabilities, strategic choices and risk 
assessments. 
According to the 2013 Defence White Paper, there are only two force 
structure determinants. In descending order of importance they are: to 
develop a force “to deter and defeat armed attacks on Australia”; and to 
“contribute to stability and security in the South Pacific and Timor 
Leste.”10 Although rhetorically useful in setting out some of the generic 
reasons for having a defence force, these determinants are of little 
practical use in designing a fit-for-purpose force. Furthermore, they 
ignore a whole range of other tasks that do not fall into either category, 
but nonetheless merit consideration when designing the future force. 
Why should a country like Timor Leste, for example, be singled out as a 
force structure determinant over other countries or regions where 
Australia has already, or may conceivably, deploy the ADF? And why 
are these determinants not subject to a rigorous and transparent risk 
assessment process which allows for the objective testing of 
assumptions and the conventional wisdom used to justify the purchase 
of particular equipment and systems? There is little to suggest that a risk 
assessment process has been used in a systematic way for force 
structure planning, or to guide acquisition and resource decisions, 
despite the fact that one was developed specifically for this purpose after 
the 2009 Defence White Paper.11 
There is ample evidence that even the declared force structure 
determinants have been repeatedly ignored, or discounted, when buying 
defence equipment. The decision to purchase six long-range, heavy-lift 
C-17 (Globemaster III) aircraft was driven more by opportunism and a 
perceived need to deploy personnel and materiel to distant theatres of 
operation rather than by their contribution to defeating armed attacks on 
Australia, or security and stability in the South Pacific. The same could 
be said of the Aegis-equipped air warfare destroyers and long-range 
submarines, all of which seem designed for a more robust and 
expansive defence force than our force structure determinants and 
declared strategy would suggest. 
There is little to suggest 
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This dogmatic adherence to untested assumptions has historically 
produced implausible planning scenarios and errors of strategic 
judgement that would not have survived a well-conceived and 
meticulously applied risk assessment process. Examples are the 
unrealistic “low-level” and “escalated low-level conflicts” that informed 
our strategy and force structure in the 1987 Defence White Paper and 
the later, equally unlikely, scenario of a major power attacking Australia 
from bases in Indonesia or Papua New Guinea at a time when no major 
power, other than our ally the United States, had the ability to do so.12 
The 2009 Defence White Paper attempted to rule out deployments to 
conflicts that could draw the ADF into urban warfare on the grounds that 
such deployments would risk unsustainably high casualties for a 
numerically small army.13 But to paraphrase the old Bolshevik line, “even 
if we have no interest in urban warfare, it may have an interest in us.”14 
Thousands of years of armed conflict should have taught Defence that 
no army gets to choose the wars it will fight, or where it will fight. 
Conflicts can transmute from one type of warfare to another in a matter 
of months and sometimes days. The spread of hybrid, irregular conflicts 
suggests that future ground wars will be largely fought for control of cities 
and urban agglomerations, so the ADF cannot simply opt out of urban 
warfare. This is not to argue that the ADF should be structured for urban 
warfare or that the risks should not be carefully assessed. But as the 
ongoing conflict in Iraq attests, an urban warfare capability is an 
essential part of the military toolkit of any credible defence force. The 
ADF must be able to fight and win in all terrain, because a competent 
adversary will seek to exploit our perceived weaknesses, not our 
strengths. 
THE FALSE PROMISE OF STRATEGIC WARNING 
A fifth problem is the concept of strategic warning, which has become “a 
crucial element of defence planning.”15 The notion that Australia could 
expect to receive sufficient warning of any major threat, and therefore 
buy time to expand the ADF and mobilise the population, has long 
historical antecedents. It had some planning utility when conventional 
military conflicts between states were the primary form of warfare.  
However, in an era of complex, transnational challenges and messy, 
irregular conflicts which can arise at extremely short notice, it would be 
dangerous to believe that our intelligence community can be relied upon 
to provide timely warning of significant threats. Even the best intelligence 
has its limits. It is becoming progressively more difficult to provide 
strategic warning of imminent threats sufficient to allow a calibrated 
expansion of the ADF, let alone full national mobilisation. 
A related misconception is that white papers can, and should, confidently 
peer up to 30 years into the future, to allow informed decisions about 
specific military capabilities that we should begin to acquire now. This 
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was always a dubious defence planning proposition since such 
perspicacity is beyond the limits of human foresight. No analyst of 
international affairs in 1985 could have anticipated the world in 2015 as a 
glance at intelligence assessments from that period bear out.16 But in an 
era of accelerating technological change, it makes even less strategic 
and financial sense to invest billions of dollars on military capabilities in 
the expectation that they will still be operationally effective thirty years 
hence. 
Long-term intelligence forecasting can help defence policymakers to 
understand broad technological and military trends. But it should not be 
used to justify major acquisition and capability decisions or to anticipate 
the future operating environment for the ADF beyond a twenty-year 
horizon. 
KNOWING OUR FRIENDS TOO 
Finally, we need to know our friends at least as well as our potential 
adversaries. Given the centrality of the alliance with the United States to 
Australia’s strategic calculations, there is a worrying superficiality about 
much of the analysis of recent shifts in US strategic thinking. The 
essential task for Australian planners is to understand how changes in 
US strategy, funding and military dispositions are likely to impact on 
Australia and to draw the necessary conclusions. 
What should be evident is that the United States is moving away from its 
traditional strategic role of global security provider to that of security 
enhancer. One obvious consequence is that Washington will 
increasingly rely on allies and partners to do more of the defence heavy 
lifting, supported by a judicious and circumscribed use of US military 
power, a role described as “convene, catalyse and connect.” 17 In some 
respects, this is a return to an earlier era when the United States 
preferred to act as an “offshore balancer” and intervene in Eurasian or 
Middle Eastern conflicts decisively, at a time of its own choosing, rather 
than permanently stationing troops in theatre or engaging in long-
duration counter-insurgency campaigns.18 In Asia, however, offshore 
balancing is likely to be combined with a more cooperative approach to 
defence and security. “Federated Defence” envisages the United States 
co-developing, sharing and fostering regional defence capabilities with 
non-traditional partners, as well as allies, in pursuit of shared security 
objectives.19 
Thus, the far more cautious Obama doctrine is shaping to be the most 
significant evolution in US strategy since 9/11 when President Obama’s 
predecessor, George W Bush, famously proclaimed his global war on 
terror. The three central elements of this doctrine are that the United 
States will unilaterally defend its interests, with force if necessary; but it 
will mobilise allies and friends to confront common challenges and to 
preserve its strength; and that the United States cannot do for others 
…the United States is 
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what they must do for themselves. The Obama doctrine has particular 
implications for Australia because of the modestly endowed ADF’s 
reliance on the US military as a potent force-multiplier. We now face the 
prospect of higher defence premiums compared with our relatively free-
loading past, when largely token commitments to the alliance allowed us 
to claim the benefits of full US security cover. 
By making a significant military deployment to Iraq in the early, 
successful phase of the 2003 operation to destroy the regime of Saddam 
Hussein, Australia was able to maintain an influential seat at the US-led 
coalition table for the years that followed even though its subsequent 
commitments were sporadic and modest. In future, the United States will 
expect a greater defence contribution from Australia, especially in the 
region. The 2014 Quadrennial Defence Review makes this clear, stating 
in unequivocal terms that the United States wants “more from our allies 
even as their military power is mostly in decline, particularly relative to 
potential threats.”20  
Conversely, Washington may have less to offer in return, for budgetary 
as well as doctrinal reasons, particularly if “sequestration” forces cuts to 
military muscle as well as fat. Hence the new emphasis on blended 
forces, an allied “pool” for force demand and supply, and an increased 
emphasis on interoperability and training with allies.21 So our defence 
strategy will need to enunciate how Australia can optimise the benefits of 
the alliance in which it will be much more of an equal partner than at any 
time in the history of the ANZUS treaty, while thinking through the 
implications for our defence posture, budget and force structure. 
HOW CAN DEFENCE STRATEGY BE IMPROVED? 
The inability to clearly define our defence strategy will have serious 
policy and operational consequences if not rectified. Australia’s defence 
white papers are both the problem and the keys to the solution since 
they represent the authentic, whole-of-government voice on defence 
policy, and are the principal means through which that policy is 
communicated to audiences. As such, the forthcoming defence white 
paper provides the first real opportunity for the Abbott government to 
carry out a much-needed reset of Australia’s defence strategy by 
ensuring that declaratory and actual policy are fully aligned, key planning 
assumptions are tested, and a more versatile ADF is configured for 
future conflicts. 
CLARIFY DEFENCE STRATEGY 
A crucial first step is a clear and unambiguous statement of Australia’s 
defence and military strategies and their main objectives. The first of 
these tasks — defining defence strategy — should not be difficult, but 
whatever form of words is adopted it must recognise its two essential 
purposes. They are to shape the regional and international security 
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environment in support of a rules-based, liberal democratic order; and to 
deter and, if necessary, defeat armed attacks against the country’s 
territory, people and vital interests. 
These objectives require clarification in light of past misconceptions and 
the turbulence of Australia’s security environment. Shaping presupposes 
both a corresponding capacity and a compelling, achievable vision that 
unites Australians and matches means with ends. Maintaining and 
propagating a rules-based liberal, democratic order will be far more 
difficult in a world where Pax Americana is fraying at the edges. 
Although the United States is likely to remain the world’s pre-eminent 
state, in aggregate terms power is seeping away from Western liberal 
democracies with which Australia has been traditionally aligned. In place 
of Pax Americana is a more fragmented, illiberal world featuring a new 
cast of players  some of whom possess significant military reach and 
hold competing visions of the future world and regional orders. The real 
task for the ADF is to help protect Australia’s security interests in the 
emerging world order, or disorder, as the case may be. This will require 
a new, more proactive defence strategy and some difficult decisions. 
EVOLVE THE US ALLIANCE AND DIVERSIFY REGIONAL 
DEFENCE RELATIONSHIPS  
The fraying of the American-centric order means that we should deepen 
and broaden our regional defence partnerships within, and beyond, the 
ANZUS alliance. The best way to adjust to the realities of the United 
States as a security enhancer is by pursuing partnerships with regional 
states that broadly share our strategic views, even when they do not 
share our values. Indonesia is the stand-out example of an Asian 
neighbour with which we need to forge a closer, more encompassing 
defence relationship despite the differences in our values. India, Vietnam 
and the Philippines also warrant a higher priority. 
Future defence cooperation should emphasise improving regional 
maritime surveillance and response capabilities, information sharing and 
strategic, “smart power” investments in military education and training 
that can generate disproportionately large security returns for relatively 
small outlays. Rather than the piecemeal approach which has thus far 
characterised defence engagement with the region, we need to better 
harness our alliance and non-alliance defence partnerships to the 
overarching objectives of defence strategy.  
Deterring and defeating attacks on the nation’s territory, people and vital 
interests will be considerably more demanding and costly in an era of 
declining US power and protean threats. The US nuclear umbrella and 
conventional military power is a far less effective deterrent against non-
state adversaries and cyber threats, where the identity and location of 
attackers may be elusive or unprovable. The 2015 defence white paper 
should make clear that Australia, as a robust middle power, ought to be 
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capable of independently deterring and defeating peer adversaries by 
out-thinking and out-fighting them. 
However, against more powerful states we would be outmatched. That is 
why the US alliance remains fundamental to our military strategy and 
why we must remain invested in its strength. But it does not mean an 
unthinking acceptance of US policy positions or marching in lock step 
with the US on strategy and operations without a considered 
assessment of the implications. With Australia poised to become a key 
provider of security assets for the United States as Washington’s pivot to 
Asia gains momentum and our strategic interests converge, the 
government will need to make some important decisions about the future 
direction of the alliance. 
A good start would be a clear statement of the purpose and desirable 
level of closer interoperability with the US military and greater 
transparency about the associated risk-benefit calculation. This should 
be accompanied by an explanation of the reasons for the distinct 
weighting in our procurement policy towards buying US systems and 
technology and why intelligence cooperation with the United States is a 
net benefit to Australia’s defence capabilities and budget. 
Australians also need to know whether other locations and defence 
installations are destined to become force-multipliers for the United 
States as it rebalances towards a “more geographically distributed, 
operationally resilient, and politically sustainable force” in Asia.22 If the 
US military presence in Australia is going to expand, what is the strategic 
justification for a closer defence alignment with the United States in the 
Indo-Pacific? Finally, the forthcoming white paper should make clear 
what new investments in infrastructure, technology and military systems 
will be required to leverage off the more austere, but still powerful US 
military. 
MAKE THE ADF MORE VERSATILE 
An interest-based defence strategy is the key to a more versatile, 
capable and useable ADF. Australia must be able to deploy and sustain 
a credible military force anywhere in the world, not just in our own 
backyard, reflecting our long and positive record of foreign policy 
activism, international defence engagement and ranking as the world’s 
13th largest economy. As the 2013 Defence White Paper acknowledges, 
the ability to project military hard power a long way from the Australian 
continent is entirely consistent with territorial defence, our alliance 
obligations and established reputation for good global citizenship.23 This 
aspiration is no longer just rhetorical with the imminent arrival of the two 
large amphibious ships, HMAS Canberra and Adelaide. Each has a 
range of 9000 nautical miles — further than the distance from Sydney to 
Kuwait — and is capable of transporting in one movement more than 
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1000 troops with their supporting heavy equipment, in addition to a mix 
of transport and anti-submarine helicopters. 
Since threats can arise with little warning and from almost anywhere, it 
makes no sense to design our defence force to combat a particular kind 
of threat coming from a specific point on the compass, or to privilege the 
near over the far. The future ADF must be able to defend against an 
array of often interlocked security threats, both near and far, which 
means dispensing with the erroneous notion that a force designed for 
one contingency can provide optimal outcomes for all contingencies. A 
far better approach is to identify our core defence interests and the 
generic military capabilities needed to protect them, for it is folly to 
predict where, and against whom, the future ADF will operate. 24 
DEVELOP A “FULL SPECTRUM” MILITARY STRATEGY AND 
MATCHING CAPABILITIES 
Australia should develop and pursue a “full spectrum” military strategy in 
recognition of the need to provide protection against military threats 
emanating from outer space and cyber space, as well as the land, sea 
and air. 
Full spectrum defence is an integrated, five-domain military strategy that 
exploits Australia’s technological strengths and unique ability to leverage 
off the still- dominant communications, intelligence and space-based 
capabilities of the United States. Such a strategy would enable Australia 
to deter and defeat adversaries with far larger military forces as well as 
incipient and established non-state threats. Some of the capabilities 
required to implement this strategy, such as airborne early warning and 
control aircraft and air warfare destroyers, are already in place or in 
prospect. But there has to be greater connectivity and investment across 
the five domains with a military strategy to match. 
For virtually all conceivable future defence contingencies, the ADF will 
need to draw upon a diverse suite of capable air, naval and land forces. 
However, these forces must be bound together by advanced control, 
communications and surveillance systems which are the key 
determinants of future battlefield success and the vital enablers of other 
important defence tasks ranging from humanitarian assistance and 
disaster relief to counter-terrorism, counter-insurgency operations and 
information warfare. 25 
Those who support funding for a particular part of the defence force, 
while decrying a core capability for another part, often fail to understand 
that the ADF must be a balanced force, not a niche force capable of 
conducting a limited range of tasks. So we need modern tanks and 
armoured combat vehicles, as well as ships, submarines and aircraft. 
And the ADF must be able to fight in all domains, including cities and 
towns, because our illiberal adversaries may deliberately choose to fight 
in urban areas as a way of negating Australia’s technological and 
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conventional military strengths. Importantly, there must be a judicious 
balance between having some elements of the ADF always combat-
ready, while maintaining the capabilities of the overall force and building 
for the future. A balanced ADF also requires a capacity for theatre-level 
ballistic missile defence in order to combat advances in the range, use 
and lethality of ballistic missiles in the Indo-Pacific region. 
IMPLEMENT A COMPREHENSIVE STRATEGIC RISK 
MANAGEMENT PROCESS 
Full spectrum defence will require a more rigorous approach to defence 
planning. A first step is to replace arbitrary force structure determinants 
with less prescriptive planning considerations and principles that can 
guide defence planners in thinking about the optimum size, balance and 
capabilities of the desired future force. Their purpose should be to clarify 
defence planning assumptions with a view to identifying conceptual 
weaknesses and illuminating personal and institutional bias. 
A vital second step would be the speedy implementation of a 
comprehensive strategic risk assessment process that would weigh 
threats against identified defence vulnerabilities according to an agreed 
set of risk criteria.26 Risk ratings would be used to inform decisions about 
new capabilities and ensure that resources are allocated where they are 
most needed, rather than on the basis of institutional power, personal 
whim or lowest common denominator trade-offs between the Army, 
Navy and Air Force. 27 Above all, the risk assessment process must be 
transparent and encourage contestability.  
To ensure that the system works as intended the government should 
insist that all significant force structure, acquisition and resource 
decisions must be subject to a full strategic risk assessment. If they are 
not, then the obvious question to be asked is why not? The government 
must also lead by example, taking a disciplined and strategic approach 
to defence planning. This means eschewing the commercial and political 
opportunism that has repeatedly led to the purchase of defence systems 
that are ill-suited to Australia’s needs or impose high opportunity costs in 
other areas of defence. 
SHORTEN ACQUISITION RESPONSE TIMES AND RETHINK 
MOBILISATION 
There is a need to reduce the excessively long time-frames for 
purchasing, developing and deploying new defence capabilities. Given 
the unprecedented rapidity of technological change it is unrealistic, as 
well as imprudent, to expect most of today’s aircraft, ships, submarine, 
tanks and their enabling systems to be survivable in high- and medium-
intensity conflicts beyond thirty years, even with expensive mid-life 
upgrades. 
A balanced ADF also 
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A more sensible approach is to focus on what is really needed for the 
next twenty years and build greater flexibility into the acquisition process 
by continuously upgrading defence systems and technology, and 
undertaking less gold-plating and more automation. Replacing ageing 
components and platforms in shorter timeframes will lessen the risk of 
premature obsolescence, thereby improving the ADF’s operational 
readiness and combat edge.  
We also need to rethink our approach to mobilisation. In the major wars 
of the last century, embryonic professional militaries were rapidly scaled 
up by recruiting large numbers of volunteers from civilian life who could 
be trained to fight in weeks. Rapid mobilisation and enlargement are far 
more difficult today because of the complexity of modern warfare and the 
speed with which new or hybrid threats can emerge, as the Russian 
intervention in Ukraine and the rise of Islamic State in Iraq underline. 
Since 20th century-style mass mobilisation is not a realistic, or desirable, 
response for 21st- century threats, then we have to find alternative ways 
of adding critical mass and cutting-edge combat and enabling 
capabilities at short notice. 
Making the existing reserves more combat ready is only part of the 
solution because there are not enough active reservists with the right 
skill sets. In an emergency, and without the option of full national 
mobilisation, more innovative approaches will be needed if the aim is to 
substantially expand ADF numbers and capabilities within six months of 
a decision to do so. This goes well beyond finding a few hundred extra 
infantry soldiers, or a handful of doctors. It may be possible, for example, 
to generate a 10 or 20 per cent increase in military power quickly for an 
extended period of time by enhancing the existing stand-by reserve, 
which holds a substantial pool of non-active but recently retired defence 
personnel. Leveraging off the civilian sector’s advanced skills in health, 
transport, engineering, communications technology, systems 
management and other sectors of the economy would also help to flesh 
out deployed military units or provide back-up at home.  
CONCLUSION 
An unwillingness to rethink planning processes that have passed their 
use-by-date is a recipe for building a defence force that is ill-equipped to 
protect Australia and its vital interests. Managing the risks that arise from 
a demonstrably more volatile, complex and demanding security 
environment will not be easy, given the erosion of traditional Western 
pre-eminence in military affairs and a United States which is no longer 
willing, or able, to play the role of global policeman. 
Australia needs a smarter, forward-looking defence strategy that is 
global as well as regional, that identifies what the ADF needs to do, 
eliminates the gap between rhetoric and practice, and replaces dogma 
with a transparent and contestable risk assessment process. While the 
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onus is on our defence planners to think more creatively and fearlessly 
about the strategic choices they present to government, our politicians 
must play their role too. Greater engagement and leadership on defence 
issues would be a good start. But they must also resist the temptation to 
play politics with defence policy by interfering with good process, 
remembering that the next generation of Australians may have to pay 
the price for today’s poor defence decisions. 
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Government Publishing Service, 1987): 2 (footnote 1); Department of Defence, 
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March 2012): 4. 
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Research Paper No.1, Commonwealth of Australia, June 2014. 
8 Defence White Paper 2013: 80. 
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10 Defence White Paper 2013: 28, 31. These two determinants are almost 
identical to those of the 2009 Defence White Paper. 
11 Known as the Strategic Risk Assessment (SRA) process. 
12 The Defence of Australia: 24-25. 
13 Defending Australia in the Asia Pacific Century: Force 2030: 56. This caveat is 
sometimes called the ‘Fallujah clause” referring to the high casualties sustained 
by US Marines in 2004 when retaking the city of Fallujah in Iraq from occupying 
insurgent forces. 
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“Sizing US Ground Forces: From “2 Wars” to “1 War + 2 Missions,” The 
Washington Quarterly, 37:1 (Spring 2014): 153. 
15 Defending Australia in the Asia Pacific Century: Force 2030: 27. 
16 See, for example, the concerns and studies of the US Department of Defence 
in this period. William M. Arkin, “Beltway bandits,” Bulletin of the Atomic 
Scientists, 41:8 (September 1985). 
17 In the words of a former US State Department policy advisor, Anne-Marie 
Slaughter. “Filling Power Vacuums in the New Global Legal Order,” Boston 
College Law Review 54, 3 (2013): 923, 
http://lawdigitalcommons.bc.edu/bclr/vol54/iss3/4. See also Bruce W. Jentleson, 
“Strategic Recalibration: Framework for a 21st-Century National Security 
Strategy,” The Washington Quarterly, 37, 1 (Spring 2014): 121. 
18 Former US Secretary of Defense Chuck Hagel has made it abundantly clear 
that the United States will no longer size the military “to conduct long and large 
stability operations.” US Secretary of Defense, Chuck Hagel, FY15 Budget 
Preview, (speech, 24 February 2014), 
http://www.defense.gov/Speeches/Speech.aspx?SpeechID=1831. 
19 Michael J. Green, Kathleen H. Hicks and Zack Cooper, “Federated Defense in 
Asia,” A Report of the Federated Defense Project, Center for Strategic and 
International Affairs, December 2014: v. 
20 U S Department of Defense, Quadrennial Defense Review 2014, 4 March 
2014: 63. US quadrennial defence reviews perform essentially the same function 
as Australia’s defence white papers. 
21 Ibid. 
22 Ibid: 34. 
23 Defence White Paper 2013: 29-30. 
24 A point made in Australian Defence: 1,7 and 10. 
25 In military jargon, these are known as C4ISR technologies — a reference to 
command, control, communications, computers, intelligence, surveillance and 
reconnaissance capabilities. 
26 For a discussion of strategic risk management in an Australian context see 
Alan Dupont and William J. Reckmeyer, “Australia’s national security priorities: 
addressing strategic risk in a globalised world,” Australian Journal of International 
Affairs, 66:1 (February 2012): 34-51. 
27 The risk rating would be arrived at through a mixture of quantitative and 
qualitative evaluations and weighing the likelihood of possible threats against 
their strategic consequences. There would be room for minority views but where 
possible a consensus would be sought for key judgements. 
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